



Savings: 2

Abhijit Banerjee
Esther Duflo
14.73



Returns from Using Fertilizer

- ▶ Experiment in Busia, Kenya
- ▶ Experiments on pilot plots on farmers' plot.
- ▶ Not taking into account labor costs:
 - Over 3.4 months: 27%
 - Annualized: 106%
- ▶ Taking into account extra labor cost
 - At the daily wage rate: 56%
 - At the opportunity cost: 102%




Why Don't Farmers Use Fertilizer?

- ▶ Knowledge?
 - Well-known technology, long history of use.
 - 98% on demonstration plot say that they want to use, 36.8% use it
- ▶ Credit constraints?
 - No technical non-convexities in fertilizer use.
 - Could gradually accumulate.
- ▶ Farmers say they want to use fertilizer, but do not have cash to purchase.
 - Take seriously?
 - Farmers have money at harvest, but not at planting
 - Why don't they save up?
 - Why don't they buy fertilizer when they have money?

Nobody purchases early


- A small survey of farmers to ask them about timing of purchase :
- in the last season, 2% of them (3.8% of those who used fertilizer at all) had purchased it early;
- in previous season, 2% of those who used fertilizer purchased it early.



The SAFI Program


Savings and Fertilizer Initiative

- ▶ Randomized, stratified by earlier treatment
- ▶ Visit household at harvest time, offer to sell fertilizer
 - Saves a trip to market to buy fertilizer.
 - Requires immediate decision on fertilizer quantity + type.




Second SAFI season

- 1) New group of basic SAFI farmers.
- 2) Choice of SAFI timing: early, when they have cash or later, when need fertilizer
- 3) Two other groups visited close to time when fertilizer needs to be applied
 1. Free delivery
 2. 50% discount




Results from SAFI 1

- ▶ 11.4 – 14.3 percentage point increase in adoption in season offered (46–63% over comparison group).
- ▶ No persistent impact on fertilizer use




Results from SAFI 2

- ▶ SAFI increases fertilizer use 18 percentage points.
- ▶ Later visit – no significant impact on fertilizer use
- ▶ 50% discount – 13 percentage point increase
- ▶ Impact of the “SAFI with *ex ante* timing choice” on fertilizer use is slightly larger than the basic SAFI program
 - Why should this be the case
 - About half of people requested early visit
- ▶ No persistent effect



What could be going on?

- ▶ These people have money at harvest time
- ▶ And want fertilizer
- ▶ But spend it before planting
- ▶ Why?
- ▶ Because they want to buy fertilizer now
 - But want even more to consume a bit more now and cut back tomorrow to pay for the fertilizer




Time inconsistent preferences

- ▶ For example, people who maximize


$$U(c_0) + \beta\delta U(c_1) + \beta\delta^2 U(c_2) + \beta\delta^3 U(c_3) + \dots$$

- ▶ Starting from today...
- ▶ And do it all the time...
- ▶ How does this help us understand the Kenyan farmers?



Do people really have such preferences?

- ▶ Ashraf, Karlan and Yin asked 1700 subjects in the Philippines the following three questions
- ▶ Question #1: "Would you prefer 200 pesos now or 250 pesos in one month?"
- ▶ If the respondent preferred 200 pesos now over 250 pesos in one month, Question #2 was asked. “
- ▶ "Would you prefer 200 pesos now or 300 pesos in one month?"
- ▶ If the respondent preferred 200 pesos now over 300 pesos in one month, Question #3 was asked.
- ▶ Question #3: "How much would we have to give you in one month for you to choose to wait?"
- ▶ Then (after 15 mins) same questions but starting in 6 months



Tabulations of Responses to Hypothetical Time Preference Questions

			Indifferent between 200 pesos in 6 months and X in 7 months			
			Patient	Somewhat Impatient	Most Impatient	Total
			X<250	250<X<300	300<X	
Indifferent between 200 pesos now and X in one month	Patient	X<250	606 34.4%	126 7.2%	73 4.1%	805 45.7%
	Somewhat Impatient	250<X<300	206 11.7%	146 8.3%	59 3.3%	411 23.3%
	Most Impatient	300<X	154 8.7%	93 5.3%	299 17%	546 31%
	Total		966 54.8%	365 20.7%	431 24.5%	1,762 100%



"Hyperbolic": More patient over future tradeoffs than current tradeoffs



"Patient Now, Impatient Later": Less patient over future tradeoffs than current tradeoffs.




Time inconsistent (direction of inconsistency depends on answer to open-ended question).

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Sophistication versus naivete

- ▶ Can this really explain the fertilizer puzzle?
- ▶ Don't they realize that this is what they are doing? This is called sophistication
- ▶ What if they were sophisticated?
 - Would they buy fertilizer when they have money?
 - Would they buy more if it was brought to them?
- ▶ On the other hand: suppose they were not sophisticated.
 - Would they want SAFI right after harvest?
- ▶ Some limited sophistication.



A test of sophistication

- ▶ Ashraf, Karlan, Yin offered their subjects a lock-box
- ▶ They could put money away in a lock-box until they either reached a particular amount or a particular date.
- ▶ Most people did not want it.
- ▶ But among those who did, being hyperbolic increases take up by 16%
- ▶ They know that they are hyperbolic.
- ▶ But effect only among women.

TABLE I
Clients' Specific Savings Goals

	Frequency	Percent
Christmas/Birthday/Celebration/Graduation	95	47.0%
Education	41	20.3%
House/Lot construction and purchase	20	9.9%
Capital for Business	20	9.9%
Purchase or Maintenance of Machine/Automobile/Appliance	8	4.0%
Did not report reason for saving	6	3.0%
Agricultural Financing/Investing/Maintenance	4	2.0%
Vacation/Travel	4	2.0%
Personal Needs/Future Expenses	3	1.5%
Medical	1	0.5%
Total	202	100.0%
Date-based goals	140	69.3%
Amount-based goals	62	30.7%
Total	202	100.0%
Bought Ganansiya Box	167	82.7%
Did not buy Ganansiya Box	35	17.3%
Total	202	100.0%

Experimental Context - Overview

- ▶ *Location* - Busia, Kenya: border town/commercial center in Western Province
- ▶ *Partner* - Family Bank of Kenya
 - ▶ A commercial bank with over 50 branches throughout Kenya
 - ▶ Approximately Ksh 7.9 billion (USD 100 million) in customer deposits at end of FY 2009
 - ▶ Actively targeting low to middle income earners with low fee banking products
 - ▶ *Mwananchi Account*: Current account with no monthly fees, operating balance of Ksh 100 (\$1.25), no deposit fees. Withdrawal fees of Ksh 30/62 with/without ATM card. Fee for ATM card - Ksh 300 (\$3.75)
- ▶ *Target Population* - Married couples interested in opening savings accounts and residing in areas near Family Bank's Busia branch (analysis sample: 0.2-7.7 miles away)

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Experimental Protocol - The Basic Idea

- ▶ Group meetings at primary schools; Offer married couples 3 different savings accounts (1 joint, 1 individual account for each spouse)
- ▶ Randomly vary "promotional" interest rates on these three accounts (6-month APY of 0, 2, 6, or 10%). All accounts funded with minimum balance of Ksh 100
- ▶ Measure rates of time preference for all participants
- ▶ Administrative data from bank: 6 months of account activity

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Experimental Protocol - Interest Rate Design

$R_J=2$					$R_J=6$					$R_J=10$				
	$R_M=0$	$R_M=2$	$R_M=6$	$R_M=10$		$R_M=0$	$R_M=2$	$R_M=6$	$R_M=10$		$R_M=0$	$R_M=2$	$R_M=6$	$R_M=10$
$R_F=0$	2, -2,-2	0, 0,-2	-4, 4,-6	-8, 8,-10	$R_F=0$	6, -6,-6	4, -4,-6	0, 0,-6	-4, 4,-10	$R_F=0$	10,-10, -10	8, -8,-10	4, -4,-10	0, 0,-10
$R_F=2$	0, -2,0	0, 0,0	-4, 4,-4	-8, 8,-8	$R_F=2$	4, -6,-4	4, -4,-4	0, 0,-4	-4, 4,-8	$R_F=2$	8, -10,-8	8, -8,-8	4, -4,-8	0, 0,-8
$R_F=6$	-4, -6,4	-4, -4,4	-4, 0,0	-8, 4,-4	$R_F=6$	0, -6,6	0, -4,6	0, 0,0	-4, 4,-4	$R_F=6$	4, -10,-4	4, -8,-4	4, -4,-4	0, 0,-4
$R_F=10$	-8, -10,8	-8, -8,8	-8, -4,4	-8, 0,0	$R_F=10$	-4, -10,4	-4, -8,4	-4, -4,4	-4, 0,0	$R_F=10$	0, -10,0	0, -8,0	0, -4,0	0, 0,0

Notes: The first number in interior cells is the excess interest on the joint account. The excess interest on the husband's and wife's account follow respectively.

Key: Random variation in $excess_a = R_a - \max \{ R_{a'} : a' \neq a \}$

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"Baseline" Results

- ▶ Respondents have low levels of education (<8 years), save in variety of ways
- ▶ Randomization was successful
- ▶ Respondents robustly respond to interest rates (higher savings rates, higher average balances)

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
Measuring Rates of Time Preference - Survey Questions

- ▶ Respondents administered 10 tables of 5 questions each, asking them to choose between Ksh $x \in \{290, 220, 150, 80, 10\}$ at time $t_1 \in \{\text{tomorrow, 2 weeks, 4 weeks}\}$ or Ksh 300 at time $t_2 \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 12 \text{ weeks}\}$
 - ▶ Assume Ksh 300 at $t_2 \succ$ Ksh 0 at t_1 and Ksh 300 at $t_1 \succ$ Ksh 300 at t_2
- ▶ Calendars to enhance salience
- ▶ 1 in 5 chance of winning one of their choices (drawn at random)
- ▶ Only estimate exponential discount factor (in spirit of model)
 - ▶ Nonlinear least squares

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Substantial Intracouple Heterogeneity in Preference Parameters

Measure of heterogeneity for couple c : $\hat{\delta}_{Mc} - \hat{\delta}_{Fc}$



⇒ Label 33% of couples with $\hat{\delta}_{Mc} - \hat{\delta}_{Fc}$ closest to 0 as "well-matched"

⇒ See *Demographics by Match Quality*

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Account Use Patterns Match Theory, Robust to Wide Range of Controls

$$y_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 match_c + \beta_2 joint_dev_c + x'_c \delta + \gamma_{sessn} + \varepsilon_c$$

Estimates of β_1 by Account Type

	Saved	Avg. Balance	Frac. Savings
Individual Accounts			
Well Matched	-0.0870*** (0.0228)	-84.2 (56.2)	-0.119*** (0.0324)
DV Mean (Omitted)	0.114	126	0.200
N	1194	1194	512
Joint Accounts			
Well Matched	0.109** (0.0518)	95.6 (103)	0.241*** (0.0740)
DV Mean (Omitted)	0.271	174	0.601
N	597	597	256

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$$y_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 match_c + \beta_2 joint_dev_c + x'_c \delta + \gamma_{sessn} + \varepsilon_c$$

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Measuring Responses to the Excess Interest Rate

Run following *separately* for well matched, badly matched by account type



$$saved_{ac} = \beta_0 + \lambda_{excess} + int'_{ac} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ac}$$

⇒ Predicted savings rates for each excess rate, conditional on account type, interest rate

⇒ *Review Theoretical Responses*

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

Well Matched Couples Respond to Individual Excess Interest As Expected



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Well Matched Couples Respond to Joint Excess Interest As Expected



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