

# Emissions Trading

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# Outline

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- What is Cap-and-Trade?
- Some History and Pictures
- Allocation, Allowance Value, and Electric Power Regulation



# Two Types of Emissions Trading

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## **Credit Trading, or Baseline-and-Credit**

Credit for over-control of some specified standard  
usable to excuse under-control elsewhere

Trading in differences from pre-existing standard

## **Allowance Trading, or Cap-and-Trade**

Trading in limited “rights” from the “bottom up”

No prescribed standard for individual sources

Sources respond to the “new price” by reducing  
emissions where internal cost < market price

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# Evolution of Emissions Trading

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- Credit Trading has evolved out of conventional regulation to provide flexibility
  - Pre-existing standard (baseline) already in place
  - High transaction costs have limited use
  - Now, more project, off-system reductions
- Allowance Trading is radically different
  - Decentralized, self-contained property rights system
  - Emerged in the U.S. out of political stalemate
  - Far more successful than expected



# A Closer Look at the Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

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- An absolute limit is decided for the environmental problem
- Emitters issued tradable permits = “cap” < previous emissions
- A fundamentally different “command” to the firm
  - Measure and report emissions and
  - Surrender allowances = emissions
  - No prescribed practice, technology, reduction, etc.
- Tradability enables market and single price to coordinate efficient abatement actions (equal marginal cost)



# Three Unique Features

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- Rights to emit must be created and allocated
  - Unique in being explicit and transparent
  - Free allocation to auctioning to “cap-and-dividend”
- Emissions must be measured and reported
  - Radical innovation in environmental regulation
- Maintenance of Registry or Tracking System
  - Analogous to a check-clearing system



# Consequences and Reactions

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Efficient, Decentralized Property Rights System,

**But** “Rights to Pollute”?

Transformed Regulator...Bank-like clerk

**But** Removes Administrative Discretion



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# Some History (1)

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- Early credit-based trading (U.S., late 1970s-1980s)
    - Some cost savings, but generally disappointing
  - Leaded-gasoline phase-down (US: 1985-86)
    - 1<sup>st</sup> program w/o individual approval; successful
  - Los Angeles RECLAIM Program (1994- )
    - SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub>; local; multi-sector
  - US Acid Rain (SO<sub>2</sub>) Program (1995- )
    - Canonical cap-and-trade, very successful
    - National scope, power plants only
- 




# Some History (2)

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
- OTC/NO<sub>x</sub> Budget Program (1999- )
    - Regional, mostly power plants
  - EU ETS (2005 - )
    - First CO<sub>2</sub> and multi-national system
    - Largest cap-and-trade market and program
  - Kyoto Protocol (2008 - )
    - Government trading; essentially voluntary
  - Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2009 - )
    - 1<sup>st</sup> mandatory US program; very low prices
- 




# Why the SO<sub>2</sub> Program was Successful



# Monitored reduction in wet sulfate deposition due to Acid Rain Program



# CO<sub>2</sub> Prices in the EU ETS



# What have we learned?

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- More effective and lower cost than conventional regulation
  - Firms do respond to prices
- Many new, unexpected ways to reduce emissions
  - Many more ways than could be mandated
  - No favored approaches/technologies
- Cheapest reductions tend to where there are the most emissions: “Dirtier is cheaper”
  - A matter of amortizing fixed costs: Paid by the ton



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# The Allocation Problem

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- Cap creates a scarcity rent embodied in allowances. Who should receive it?
  - **Prior Use Claims**—incumbent emitters
    - Also, compensation and political uses
  - **Public Use Claims**—the government
    - Expenditures or tax/debt reduction
  - **Cap-and-Dividend**—Per capita to households
  - Always recycled. Issue is how & to whom?
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# Free Allocation vs. Auctioning

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- The usual dichotomy in allocation debate
    - Allowance value to gov't or corporations
    - Auctioning often coupled with “double dividend”
  - But ignores who is the ultimate recipient
    - Both govt and corp are legal shells
    - Quite different distributional outcomes
  - US debate now focused on ultimate recipients
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# Cost Implications

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- Free allocation raises **opportunity cost** issue
  - Typically fixed and historical; independent of current emissions or production
  - Allowance use incurs an opportunity cost
  - Do emitters recognize opportunity cost?
- Straight-forward with auctioning/purchase
  - Pay as for any other input into production



# Interaction with Electric Power Regulation

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- Liberalized power markets  $\Rightarrow$  marginal cost pricing
  - Allowance cost incorporated into price
  - Free allocation over-compensates *assuming* opportunity cost is recognized and passed on
- Cost-regulated markets  $\Rightarrow$  average cost pricing
  - Only incurred costs are included
  - Free allocation reduces consumer price effect

# Summary

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- A known, tested, and tried concept
  - Creates a price on emissions and reduces emissions with few other side effects
- A highly desirable form of environmental regulation
  - Radically different from conventional “command-and-control”
  - Object is to reduce and limit emissions only
  - Trading is means for least-cost compliance,
  - Profit is by-product, not the object of trading



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