

# 24.09 Minds and Machines

## Fall 11 HASS-D CI

a bit more on Valberg  
and then: perception,  
consciousness, and  
intentionality




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# Heidegger's (?) 'solution'



Image removed due to copyright restrictions. Martin Heidegger (1889 - 1976).

reject the causal picture of experience: 'there is one thing our scientific study of ourselves cannot (legitimately) include, viz. our experience—that from 'within' which we are faced by the world, the object of our scientific studies.'

but, Valberg says: 'I cannot persuade myself that it is illegitimate to extend the concept of causation to how things are within my experience...Here, as I see it, is where all the argument comes to rest.'

## summary

presumably (!), the faulty half of the antimony is the first, where we conclude:

C. no external object is an object of experience

but we haven't explained what is wrong with the argument for (C)

a question for discussion:

are the first half of the antinomy and the argument from illusion basically the same argument, differently presented?

THE PUZZLE OF  
EXPERIENCE

J. J. Valberg

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# God revisited

‘half way through the last five seconds  
God...eliminated the book  
but maintained the activity  
in my brain just as it was  
when the book was there’

class question: what’s the  
difference between this  
example and an everyday  
case of looking at a (now  
non-existent) star?





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# seeing stars compared with Valberg's example



you do not see the book when God intervenes (the book does not cause light to enter your eye, etc.)

but the star does cause light to enter your eye, etc. (so there is no obvious reason to deny that you see it)



brain state caused by the  
(now non-existent) star

brain state caused by  
God, not the book



# 'Visual qualia and visual content'

'Experiences vary widely'

Images removed due to copyright restrictions. Pictures of sandpaper, a skunk, a hand, a purple square, and an angry man.

'In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character'

# qualia and Qualia

**q**ualia are ‘the introspectively accessible properties of experiences that characterize what it’s like to have them’

‘in this standard, broad sense of the term, it is hard to deny that there are qualia’

**Q**ualia are the introspectively accessible nonrepresentational properties of experiences that characterize what it’s like to have them

**Q**ualia ‘are a philosophical myth’

# representational properties and Qualia

perceptual (in particular, visual) experiences have representational properties (e.g. the property of representing the perceiver's environment as containing a blue cube)

so visual experiences have intentionality

visual experiences also have **qualia**

they have **Qualia** just in case:

two visual experiences can be alike in representational properties but differ in qualia

but: 'I know of no such counterexample'




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more Tye, and then  
Nagel

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