Kroon starts where Crimmins does, with the conflict between Fregean truth-conditions and Russelliam phenomenology.

Fregean thesis: The contribution made by the name is not exhausted by its referent; the name contributes what the referent is *supposed* to be like. "'Hamlet does not exist' is (used to say something) true without 'Hamlet' denoting anyone" (523). It says that no one is the way Hamlet is *supposed* to be.

Russellian antithesis: The truth of these statements turns on the properties of the referent.   "It is because of Hamlet's not existing that 'Hamlet does not exist' is true…it is because of the distinct beliefs Hammurabi had about these two celestial bodies—identical bodies, as it turns out—that 'Hammurabi believes that only Hesperus, not Phosphorus as well, was visible in the evening" (523).

He sees two problems with the semantic pretense account. One is about modality. Crimmins says 'Hesperus exists' expresses its fictional truth-conditions, viz. that m_H presents something. But then it should be true in a possible world w iff m_H presents something in w. However this fails in both directions; Hesperus exists in worlds where m_H doesn't exist, say because life never evolved. And m_H might well present something (e.g. Mars) even in worlds where Hesperus doesn't exist. Again, Hamlet arguably *couldn't* have existed; but our Hamlet-idea could have referred. Similarly Hesperus is *necessarily* identical Phosphorus but it holds only contingently that m_H presents the same thing as m_P.

The second problem is that 'exists' and 'is identical to' mean one thing in the game, a completely different thing outside it. Postulating an ambiguity is the lazy person's approach to philosophy. Better if we could explain Frege cases without departing from the literal meaning of 'exists' (it's true of everything) or 'identical to' (the relation a thing bears to itself).

He structures his own theory around an analogy between 'Hamlet doesn't exist' and quasi-paradoxical disclaimers like 'That woman isn't a woman.' His story about the latter: "The interpretive tension generated by the utterance tells his audience that he is only pretending that his means of securing reference with 'that woman' singles out a woman….What the speaker then asserts is that, construed from outside the pretense, this [phrase] singles out an individual who is not a woman, thereby asserting of the individual referred to that this individual is not a woman" (530).

Similarly 'Hamlet doesn't really exist' creates an "interpretive tension" which the speaker uses to assert that (12) Outside of the pretense that the underlying reference determiner secures reference to an individual, it fails to secure reference to any individual (532). 'Those two famous celestial bodies are identical' "involves a contradiction inside the pretense…" This leads the audience to "look beyond [the] evident, graphic falsity to other claims which are thereby made salient." Part of what the speaker asserts is (4) Outside the scope of the pretense that 'H' and 'P' secure reference to two celestial bodies, they secure reference to a single object only (531).

How does this help with the modal problem? How does it help with the ambiguity problem? See p. 533-4

How convincing is Kroon's pragmatic pretense account? There are jillions of ways to resolve "interpretive tension." Why should the resolution take the form Kroon wants? The tension created by

'That woman is not a woman' could also be relieved by taking the *predicate* to be uttered in a spirit of make believe (*is not out of the pages of Cosmopolitan*). Likewise one could resolve the tension brought on by an utterance of 'Hamlet does not exist' by lightening up on the predicate: *we have disowned him,* or *he has disappeared from the official records.*

Kroon seems to underestimate the gap between showing that his proposed mechanism *could* churn out the desired reading and showing that it *would* churn out the desired reading. Not unlike what we saw with Grice, the mechanism is too close to a black box stipulated to produce the correct results.

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