

Habituals and Dispositionals: Part 1

- So far, we have looked at sentences that express generalizations over individuals.
- 1) Dogs are mammals.
- Next, we will look at sentences that express generalizations over situations/events.
- 2) When John walks to school, he listens to music.
- 3) Mary smokes when she comes home.

1. Quantification over situations

- In sentences like (4), the adverb quantifies over situations/events:
- 4) When Kim visits her parents, she always/often/rarely takes the train.
(von Fintel 1995: 3)
- First try: all/many/few situations in which Kim visits her parents are situations in which she takes the train.

[two positions in the literature: adverbs of quantification may bind an unlimited number of free variables in their scope (Lewis/Heim); adverbs of quantification only quantify over situations or events (Krifka 1987, Berman 1987, Schubert & Pelletier 1989, Heim 1990, von Fintel 1994, 1995, Chierchia 1995, Percus 1997, Elbourne 2003, and many others)]

- Kratzer's situation semantics (Kratzer 1989)
- Sentences denote propositions.
- Propositions are sets of possible situations.
- Possible situations are parts of possible worlds.
- Situations stand in a part-whole relation such that:
- 5) For all $s \in S$, there is a unique $s' \in S$ such that $s \leq s'$ and for all $s'' \in S$, if $s' \leq s''$, then $s'' = s'$.
(Kratzer 2002: 660)
- Free fusion: Any two situations can form a mereological sum.
- Quantification over situations is a tricky business due to the part-whole structure of the domain of situations (see von Fintel 1995, 1997/2005):

When we count situations we do not count situations of just any size.

- 6) John climbed Mt. Holyoke twice. (von Fintel 1995: 5)

If the domain of the adverb **twice** consisted of all situations in which John climbed Mt Holyoke, the sentence above would come out true in a world in which John only climbed Mt. Holyoke once. Even if John climbed Mt Holyoke only once, there will be many situations in which John climbed Mt Holyoke. Take for instance, the situation that contains both John's climbing and the dinner he had afterwards. (von Fintel 1995: 5).

- Second try: Quantification over minimal situations.

7) For any set of situations S, the set of minimal situations in S, $\min(S) = \{s \in S: \forall s' \in S (s' \leq s \Rightarrow s' = s)\}$ (Berman 1987, Heim 1990)

8) **d-when p-q** will be true in a situation s iff d-many of the minimal p-situations that are accessible from s¹ are part of a q-situation (von Fintel 1995: 7).

9) When Kim visits her parents, she often takes the train.

True in s iff many of the minimal situations s' in which Kim visits her parents and that are accessible from s are part of a situation s'' in which Kim takes the train.

- Problems with minimality:

10) Often, when John runs, he wears his old tennis shoes. (von Fintel 1995: 5)

We seem to be counting situations in which John "starts to run, runs and stops" (von Fintel 1995: 5).

11) Church bells rang on five occasions (Kratzer, LSA notes, 2005)

Not: There were five minimal occasions in which church bells rang.

12) Whenever Hans drinks beer, it's always a whole liter (Schwarz's examples)

- Exemplification (Kratzer)

13) A situation s exemplifies a proposition p iff whenever there's a part of s in which p is not true, then s is a minimal situation in which p is true.

(Kratzer 2006, variation of a definition that appears in Kratzer 1990, 1998, 2002)

Intuitively, a situation exemplifies a proposition p is one that doesn't contain anything irrelevant to the truth of p. Two possibilities:

- (i) s is a minimal situation in which p is true.
- (ii) p is true in all subsituations of s.

14) It is raining.

¹ The accessibility relation is included to account for the modal character of some adverbs of quantification (e.g., **usually**, **traditionally**).

- 15) There are three teapots.
- 16) Josephine built an airplane.
“seems to be exemplified by minimal past situations in which Josephine built an airplane”
- 17) Josephine flew an airplane.
“seems to be exemplified by all past situations that contain airplane flying by Josephine and nothing else”
- Third try:
- 18) Church bells rang on five occasions:
Not: maximal situations that exemplify the proposition ‘church bells ring’
Maximal spatiotemporally connected that exemplify the proposition ‘church bells ring’.
(Kratzer, 2005 LSA slides)
This needs to be more general (von Stechow 2005):
Maximal uninterrupted situations that exemplify the proposition ‘church bells ring’.- Not yet:

19) Many maximal uninterrupted situations that exemplify the proposition ‘John runs’ are part of a situation in which John wears his old tennis shoes.
Wrong predictions:
Suppose that John has gone for twenty runs in his life, and worn his old tennis shoes only in one occasion. In this scenario, the sentence in 10) is clearly false.
However, the paraphrase in 19) is true: many (in fact, all) of the maximal uninterrupted situations that exemplify the proposition ‘John runs’ are part of a situation in which John wears his old tennis shoes –the situation that comprises John’s life so far.- Rothstein’s matching function (Rothstein 1995).
We need to be able to map different situations in the first argument of the quantifier onto different situations in the second argument.

20) Every time the bell rings, Mary opens the door.

21) $\forall e$ [[RING (e) & Th(e, THE BELL)] \rightarrow $\exists e'$ [OPEN (e') & Ag(e') = MARY & Th(e') = THE DOOR & M(e') = e]]
The matching function M ensures that there will be at least as many door openings as bell ringings.

22) Often, when John runs, he wears his old tennis shoes.

23) Many situations s that are maximal uninterrupted situations that exemplify the proposition 'John runs' are part of a situation s' such that John wears his old tennis shoes in s' and $M(s') = s$.

- So: **d-when p-q** will be paraphrased as follows: d-many situations s that are maximal uninterrupted situations that exemplify p are part of a situation s' such that q is true in s' and $M(s') = s$.

[But note: Barry Schein, Danny Fox and Irene Heim (p.c. to Marcelo Ferreira, reported in Ferreira 2005) point out potential counterexamples to the matching effect:

24) Every time John takes a shower, he shaves on the same day.

[fine if he showers twice a day, and shaves only one per day.]

25) Every time I swim, I get sick.

[compatible with me swimming twice within a week and getting sick only once.]

2. Generic quantification over situations.

- Standard assumption: sentences like 26) contain a null adverb of quantification, **Gen**, just like sentences like 27).

26) When John runs, he wears his old tennis shoes.

27) Dogs are mammals.

- The modal approach (Heim 1982)
- **Gen** is a modal quantifier.
- Modals are basically unselective binders.

28) Let ϕ be n operator-headed molecular formula φ consisting of “ $\text{must}_{i_1, \dots, i_n}$ ” and the two formulas φ^1 and φ^2 , Then, for any $w \in W$, $a_N \in A^N$:

$\langle w, a_N \rangle \text{ sat } \phi$ iff $\langle w', b_N \rangle \text{ sat } \varphi^2$

for every pair $\langle w', b_N \rangle$ that satisfies the following conditions

- (i) b_N agrees with a_N on all $i \notin \{i_1, \dots, i_n\}$;
- (ii) $w' R_B w$
- (iii) $\langle w', b_N \rangle \text{ sat } \varphi^1$
- (iv) for every $w'' R_B w$ such that $\langle w', b_N \rangle \text{ sat } \varphi^1$, $w' \leq_0 w''$ (Heim 1982: 179)

- 29) If a dog₁ is sick, it must be taken to the vet.
- 30) Must₁ (dog' (x₁) & sick (x₁)) ∃ (taken to the vet (x₁))
- 31) For all pairs of worlds and individuals <w', x> such that
- (i) w' is among the worlds selected by the modal base.
 - (ii) x is a dog in w' and x is sick in w', and
 - (iii) there is no world that satisfies (i) and (ii) and is better with respect to the ordering source than w'.

x is sick in w'.

NOTE: Corrections to last Friday's handout (thanks so much to Irene for discussion!)

- My formulation in the last handout said that the ordering source selected the best worlds among those selected only by the ordering source, rather than among those selected by the ordering source and the if-clause.
- To see the difference, consider the following example:

32) According to scientific evidence, if an animal presents abnormal mutations, it is healthy.

- Covert modal:

33) A dog₁ has four legs.

34) Gen₁ (x₁ is a dog) ∃ (x₁ is a dog)

35) For all pairs of worlds and individuals <w', x> such that

- (i) w' is among the worlds selected by the modal base.
- (ii) x is a dog in w'
- (iii) there is no world that satisfies (i) and (ii) and is better with respect to the ordering source than w'.

x has four legs in w'.

- Quantification over situations:

36) When John runs he wears his tennis shoes.

37) Gen₁ (s₁ is a situation in which John runs) (John wears his tennis shoes in s₁)

- 38) For all pairs of worlds and situations $\langle w', s \rangle$ such that
- (i) w' is among the worlds selected by the modal base.
 - (ii) s is a maximal uninterrupted situation in which John runs and s belongs to w' .
 - (iii) there is no world that satisfies (i) and (ii) and is better with respect to the ordering source than w' .

s is part of a situation s' in which John wears his old tennis shoes (and $M(s') = s$)

- Question: what is the modal base? What is the ordering source? We'll come back to this when we discuss Marcelo Ferreira's dissertation.
- What about sentences with no overt restriction:

39) Mary smokes.

- It seems that we can say 39) in contexts where there's no salient set of situations that could be used to restrict the domain of quantification, unlike:

40) Mary always smokes.

- In what follows, we will focus on sentences like 39), with no overt restriction.

3. Two readings?

- Generic sentences like the ones in 41) through 43) are often claimed to have two readings: a dispositional² reading and a habitual reading (see, e.g., Lawler 1973, Dahl 1975, Green 2000, among others).

41) This printer prints a hundred pages a minute. (Green 2000)

Dispositional reading: this printer has the ability of printing 100 pages/minute.

Habitual reading: this printer regularly prints 100 pages/minute.

42) This car goes 200 kph. (Schubert and Pelletier 1989)

Dispositional reading: this car is able to go 200 kph.

Habitual reading: this car regularly goes 200 kph.

43) Mary eats meat.

Dispositional reading: Mary does not object to eating meat

² Some authors (e.g., Green 2000) use the term 'capacity reading' instead.

Habitual reading: Mary eats meat regularly.

- Really two readings?
- Let's focus on the dispositional interpretation, and come back to the issue of whether there are two different readings.

4. Dispositional sentences

4.1. The modal account

44) This car goes 200 kph.

Dispositional reading: This car is able to go 200 kph.

- The sentence in 44) is perfectly felicitous in contexts where there is no contextually salient set of situations that could be used to restrict the domain of quantification. In those cases, we are presumably quantifying over all situations in which the car is driven.

45) **GEN**₁ (this car is driven in s_1) (this car goes 200 kph in s_1)

46) For all pairs of worlds and situations $\langle w', s \rangle$ such that

- (i) w' is among the worlds selected by the modal base.
- (ii) s is a maximal uninterrupted situation in which the car is driven and s belongs to w' .
- (iii) there is no world that satisfies (i) and (ii) and is better with respect to the ordering source than w' .

s is part of a situation s' where the car goes 200 kph and $M(s') = 1$

- Menendez-Benito 2005: the paraphrase above does not give us the right truth-conditions for 44).
- Let's look at the type of modality involved in the interpretation of 44):
- The sentence in 44) is interpreted with respect to a circumstantial modal base.

Relevant circumstances: the way the car is designed in the world of evaluation
the condition of the car in the world of evaluation.

Let us take the actual world to be the world of evaluation. Suppose that this car is actually designed to go 200 kph and that the car's engine is in proper condition in the actual world.

The set of accessible worlds (= worlds selected by the modal base) will then be the set in 47):

47) $\{w': \text{the car is designed to go 200 kph in } w' \text{ and the car's engine is in proper condition in } w'\}$

- Clearly, the set in 47) contains some worlds in which the car doesn't go 200 kph every time it is driven. For instance,
 - (i) worlds in which 200 kph is above the maximum speed limit permitted by the law and the driver of the car does not do anything illegal.
 - (ii) worlds in which the driver dislikes going 200 kph and the driver gets what he wants.
 - (iii) worlds in which the driver only goes 200 kph when he is in hurry, but he goes slower when he is not.... etc.

- Suppose that the ordering source is empty. Then, we would predict the sentence in 44) to be false in the actual world even when the car is actually designed to go 200 kph, and its engine is in proper condition.
- In order to avoid this result, we would need to restrict our domain of quantification by positing a suitable ordering source.
- It is not difficult to come up with ordering sources that would do the trick. For instance, consider the conversational background 'in view of what the driver wants'.

48) Given the circumstances and what the driver wants, this car goes 200 kph.

Suppose, that, in the actual world, the driver of the car wants to drive as far he can.

If we took 'in view of what the driver wants' to be the ordering source, we would get the right result.

49) For all pairs of worlds and situations $\langle w', s \rangle$ such that

- (i) the car is designed to go 200 kph and its engine is in proper condition in w'
- (ii) s is a maximal uninterrupted situation in which the car is driven and s belongs to w' .
- (iii) there is no world that satisfies (i) and (ii) and is better with respect to the driver's wishes.

s is part of a situation s' where the car goes 200 kph and $M(s') = s$

- In my dissertation, I claimed that assuming an ordering source of this type is not empirically justified: When evaluating 44) we do not seem to take into account ordering sources. When evaluating 44) we do not seem to take into account ordering sources like **what the driver wants** :

The sentence in 44) can be truthfully uttered in scenarios in which nobody owns the car and nobody has driven it yet.

The sentence in 44) can be truthfully uttered in scenarios where the car's driver hates driving fast.

- Nor do we seem to consider other conversational backgrounds that would constitute proper ordering sources for a circumstantial modal base ('what is good', 'what the law provides', 'what is advisable'...)
- The only thing that we need to take into account is the set of circumstances mentioned above: the condition the car is in and the way it is designed.
- Sentences like 44) seem to be cases of "pure" circumstantial modality – the ordering source is empty.
- If so: wrong predictions.
- What about

50) If one so desires, this car goes 200 kph (WCCFL reviewer)

Roughly:

51) For all pairs of worlds and situations $\langle w', s \rangle$ such that

- (i) the car is designed to go 200 kph and its engine is in proper condition in w'
- (ii) s is a maximal uninterrupted situation in which the car is driven and s belongs to w' .
- (iii) s is a situation in which the drivers wants the car to go 200 kph

[ordering source empty]

s is part of a situation s' where the car goes 200 kph and $M(s') = s$

- If the ordering source is empty, we still would not get the right results.

4.2. An alternative: The Possibility Hypothesis (Dahl 1975)

Hypothesis: dispositional sentences express possibilities.

- Dahl (1975): dispositional sentences express possibilities, i.e., they express existential quantification over worlds.

52) (a) John eats artichokes.

(b) Dispositional reading: there is an alternative world compatible with John's principles of behavior where he eats artichokes.

- Dahl's hypothesis reappears in subsequent work.

Kratzer (1981) notes that the German counterparts of the sentences in 53) and 54) "have a modalized reading". They seem to have an inherent modal element, which is explicit in the sentences in 55) and 56), with an overt possibility modal. (Kratzer 1981: 39).

53) Nobody runs from Andechs to Aufhausen in 10 minutes.

54) This car goes twenty miles an hour.

55) Nobody is able to run from Andechs in Aufhausen in 10 minutes.

56) This car can go twenty miles an hour.

According to Chierchia and McConnell Ginet (2000), "one of the main functions of generic sentences appears to be that of expressing capability or possibility". This, they say, is illustrated by the fact that the sentences in 57) below can be paraphrased by using an overt possibility modal, as in 58):

57) a) John runs 50 miles without ever stopping

b) This program parses complicated sentences

58) a) John can run 50 miles without ever stopping

b) This program can parse complicated sentences.

(Chierchia and McConnell Ginet: 2000: 294)

- The Possibility Hypothesis seems to give us the right results for some cases. For instance, intuitively, the sentence in 59) seems indeed to be very close to 60), with an overt possibility modal. Both of these sentences can be true in scenarios where there are no actual events of the car going 200 kph.

59) This car goes 200 kph.

60) The car can go 200 kph.

- But there are obvious counterexamples, cases where a sentence with an overt possibility modal and its 'bare generic' counterpart behave differently:
- Consider the following scenario:

Scenario 1: playing the trombone

Little John has never played the trombone in his life. But he has always thought that the trombone was a cool instrument, and he really wants to take lessons. However, he has had respiratory problems in the past. John's mom worries that these problems will prevent John from playing the trombone. She consults the family doctor, and asks him to examine John.

- After examining John, the doctor utters 61).

61) Don't worry. John can definitely play the trombone.

- While the doctor could utter 61) as his expert opinion, he could not utter 62). We would definitely hesitate to judge 62) as true in a scenario, like the above, where John has never played the trombone.

62) John plays the trombone.

- In view of the contrast between 61) and 62), the Possibility Hypothesis seems hopeless...
- But let's not give in yet! Let's try a little harder...
- How?

Strategy: looking more closely at the type of modality expressed by dispositional sentences.

Coming up next: a refinement of the Possibility Hypothesis.

4.3. Refining the Possibility Hypothesis

Dispositional sentences express a sub-type of circumstantial possibility.

- Dispositional sentences express circumstantial modality.
- Kratzer (1981) notes that when we evaluate a circumstantial modal statement, we may take into account a variety of facts.
- Consider for instance, the sentence in 63):

63) I cannot play the trombone

- a) Inner disposition: This sentence may be used to say that I don't know how to play the trombone. When a person learns how to play the trombone, "a program is filled in. And it is in view of this programme that it may be possible that I play the trombone."
 - b) Physical condition: "Suppose that I suffer from asthma. I can hardly breathe. In view of my physical condition I am not able to play the trombone, although I know how to do it. I may express that by uttering (28) [63]"
 - c) Outside situation: "(...) imagine that I am traveling by sea. The ship sinks and so does my trombone. I manage to get to a lonely island and sadly mumble (28) [63]. I could play the trombone in view of my head and my lungs, but the trombone is out of reach" (Kratzer 1981: 54).
- We know that some modals impose restrictions on the kind of conversational backgrounds they can combine with (see, e.g, Kratzer 1981).
 - Not surprisingly, there are modals that select for a particular type of circumstantial modality, e.g.,

The Hungarian suffix **-hat/-het** can only express possibilities in virtue of the outside situation (Kiefer 1980).

German **imstande sein** ('to be able') is evaluated with respect to circumstances that "are concerned with the strength of our body, character or intellect". (Kratzer 1981)

I could utter the phrase in 64) if "I have asthma or weak nerves or if I am just too stupid. I doubt whether I would say it in a situation where I haven't learnt how to play the trombone. And I could never say it on the island with my trombone lost at sea" (Kratzer 1981: 54-55).

64) Ich bin nicht imstande, Posaune zu spielen
I am not able trombone to play

The possibility hypothesis take II

- (i) Dispositional sentences contain a covert possibility modal.
- (ii) This possibility modal can only express possibilities of the “inner disposition”/ “in view of this program” type.

4.4. Exploring the hypothesis: Some scenarios

- If dispositional sentences can only express “inner dispositions” of the type described above, we can understand why we would not want to consider 65) true if John has never played the trombone.
- 65) John plays the trombone.
- Accepting 65) as true in such a scenario requires us to assume that John has acquired the skill of playing the trombone without ever having played it . Humans in our world just do not work like that!
 - But note that judgments may change if John is not a human being or if the world of evaluation is such that humans can learn to play the trombone in other ways.

Scenario 2: A different type of learning

We live in a world where people can learn how to play the trombone in the following way: they are deep-frozen for several months and, while they are in that state, they are fed a liquid that instills the skill of playing the trombone in their brains.³ Once they are defrosted they know how to play the trombone, just as if they had been practicing for years. John has just undergone this procedure – and, therefore, knows how to play the trombone—but has not practiced his newly acquired skill yet.

- In this scenario, we seem to be able to describe John’s abilities by using 65).

³ Thanks to Jan Anderssen for suggesting this type of scenario.

Scenario 3: John the robot

John is a robot that has been programmed to play the trombone and that has never been switched.

- We seem to be able to describe John's abilities by using 65) – John's 'mental program' has been filled in by the engineer that designed him.
- Now, we may have a way of handling the contrast between 66) and 67). In the case of the printer, the capacity of printing is 'hard-wired'– no learning is necessary. In the case of John, the human, however, it can only be learned. And learning how to play the trombone involves actual trombone-playing events.

66) John plays the trombone.

67) This printer prints 100 pages a minute.

- So far, we have been talking about cases that involve skills of capacities. But what about sentences like 68)?

68) Mary eats meat.

- On its dispositional reading, 68) can be paraphrased as 'Mary does not object to eating meat', i.e., Mary is not a vegetarian.
- The hypothesis above seems to make the right predictions for this case as well.

Scenario 4: Mary the vegetarian

Mary has never eaten meat in her life. Both her parents are vegetarian, and they never fed her meat when she was growing up. When she was old enough to make her own choices, she decided that her parents were right and that eating meat was morally blameworthy. She made a conscious decision never to eat meat, and she has stuck to it so far. But she is undergoing some sort of crisis. She has been reevaluating her way of life. She thinks that her decision to become a vegetarian was motivated not by moral principles, but by an unconscious desire to imitate her parents. Yesterday, she decided to start eating meat, and she called me to inform me of her decision. She also told me that she hasn't eaten any meat so far, but she will do so in the first occasion where meat is available.

We are throwing a dinner party next weekend, and we are discussing what food to cook.

You say:

69) And, of course, there has to be at least a vegetarian dish. Mary is coming.

I reply by uttering

70) Mary eats meat.

Given the scenario above, I am telling the truth.

- In this scenario, Mary's decision is enough to fill Mary's "mental program".
- But what about... ?

Scenario 5: the videogame

Peter has been watching some friends of his play a videogame. After watching for a long time, he has learnt how to play. However, he hasn't tried his hand on it yet.

- Can we say 71)?
- 71) Peter plays this videogame.
- I thought not. However, James Isaacs (p.c.) tells me that he could say 71) when reporting Peter's abilities. Other people's intuitions?
 - More probing would need to be done...

4.5. A bonus: Universal Free Choice Items.

- On their dispositional reading, these sentences license universal FC items. For instance:
- 72) (a) This printer prints any document.
'This printer is able to...'
- (b) Esta impresora imprime cualquier documento
This printer prints any document
'This printer is able to...'
- 73) (a) Mary eats any (kind of) meat.
'Mary does not object to...'
- (b) Mary come cualquier (tipo de) carne
Mary eats any (kind of) meat
'Mary does not object to...'
- Elsewhere, I have put forward an account that rules out universal FC items in necessity and episodic sentences, and predicts them to be good in possibility sentences (see Menéndez-Benito 2005)
 - If dispositional sentences express possibilities, then the licensing of universal FC items in cases like the above will be unproblematic.

4.6. Morphological evidence?

- Two separate operators:
 - (i) Universal: habituais [we will talk about this]
- 74) When John goes home, he smokes..
- (ii) Existential: dispositionals.
- Morphological evidence for this split: AAE (Green 2000).
- 75) (a) Bruce sing.
(b) Bruce be singing.

“The sentence in [(75a)] can have the reading of an existential generic, in which the meaning is roughly that there is the possibility that Bruce can sing and that he does not object to singing; he does not actually have to sing. The sentence in [(75b)], an aspectual *be*-type construction, indicates that the property expressed by the predicate occurs on particular occasions. [(75b)], means that Bruce actually sings (usually sings) on particular occasions. The distinction between [(75a)] and [(75a)] is that the latter indicates that the singing necessarily happens on particular occasions; Bruce has the habit of singing” (Green 2000: 3)

4.7. Problem: Singular indefinite objects

- 76) # John drinks a beer.
- 77) John can drink a beer.
- 78) # John smokes a cigarette
- 79) John smokes a cigarette.
- 80) # John writes a romantic song at the MAIN STREET PUB (Ferreira 2005: 61)
(suggests that John writes the same song again and again).
- 81) John can write a romantic song at the Main Street pub.
- Perhaps: not two different readings, but two different types of sentences (see Ferreira 2005)
- 82) This machine crushes oranges.

Ferreira 2005:

“If you come to me very proud of your new food processor and, tell me how easily it can peel an orange or an apple, I can reply pointing to my own machine and say

(63) Well, this machine peels a pineapple. “ (Ferreira 2005: 120)

- Ferreira (2005a) suggests sentences like (63) should be treated on a par with possibility sentences, while sentences like **John drinks beer** (habituais) need to receive a different analysis [we’ll talk about this analysis soon!]

- Something else would need to be said here: it seems that the singular indefinite is only acceptable in cases like (63) with an “even” interpretation. Why is that?
 - Would Ferreira’s suggestion make the split where we need it?
- 83) ?? This robot lifts a table.
84) ???This printer prints a document.
- NOTE: Ferreira (2005b) and Rimell (2004) point out that sentences like 85)- 87) contrast with sentences like 88)-90)
- 85) # John drinks a beer.
86) # John smokes a cigarette
87) # John writes a romantic song at the MAIN STREET PUB (Ferreira 2005: 61)
- 88) John always drinks a beer.
89) John always smokes a cigarette
90) John always writes a romantic song at the MAIN STREET PUB (Ferreira 2005: 59)
- But are 88)-90) really okay? Rimmel: the key environment for contrasting the two types of sentences is one that supplies a discourse topic.
- 91) Mary and Bob arrive at a party. Mary immediately goes to greet her friends, while Bob stays and chats with the host. The host offers Bob a drink and asks what Mary would like.
- a. Bob: Well, I am not really sure, but she usually drinks a beer.
b. Bob: # Well, I am not really sure, but she drinks a beer.
- (Rimell 2004: 6)
- The contrast between 85)- 87) / 88)-90) shows that “bare habituals” like 85)- 87) shouldn’t be analyzed as containing a silent adverbial quantifier (Ferreira 2005b, Rimell 2004)
 - **Upshot:** the same phenomenon that argues against analyzing dispositional sentences as possibility sentences provides evidence against the adverbial quantifier analysis.