

**Lecture 12: The military in multi-ethnic states**

**Week 12 Readings**

A. Enloe, Cynthia, *Ethnic Soldiers* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1980), Chapters 1, 5, 6. ISBN: 0820305073.

Ch. 1-ascriptive (primordial) and situational (constructionist) interpretations. Puzzle: does ethnicity determine politics in a country or the other way around? State often "observes" an "ethnic map" and acts accordingly.

Ch. 5-Air forces and navies in multi-ethnic states use most UN representative vs. army. Reasons: i.) ethnic distributaries at political power at time of creation II) socioeconomic stratification→ richest groups are more educated iii.) depends on how pertinent branch is to internal order←used to be army's job but air force increasingly used for counter insurgency. Technology and modernization by themselves can't reduce ethnic imbalance.

Ch. 6-William Thompson: ethnic heterogeneity not highly correlative with coups (1975). She reviews several countries and concludes that rarely do coups change the distribution of power between ethnic groups (or redefine ethnic identities) e.g. Syria, Peru, Uganda, Nigeria. Usually they are internal affairs within the dominant ethnic group. (but can still eliminate or weaken minority/weaker groups.)

**Week 12 Lecture**

Review of last time.

Broad variables in state/civil military studies. → match with control Weeks we listed → civil control of the military.

Measuring civil control variable: "binary coup/not coup not very good" (Petersen).

Thinking of a scale table 7.1 (Stepan)

Use basket of institutional measures and give a score (eg: 1 for each or Eg. 2 some weighted.) heights may depend on focus on study. Maybe expand the list a bit for more countries bigger but unweighted? If some appear to be highly correlated, you can drop some prerogatives later in study.

Try to explain field of variation. When do mechanisms emerge, when do they erode?

Petersen ideas:

Mechanisms evolve or are imposed or are bargained. Evolutions with time and not conscious

- Domestic←societal norms, can't be imposed, ethos.
- Internationally←international norms

Imposition

- By civilians←divide and conquer, constitutional/legal, centralization, civilian parallel structures
- By military←constitutional/legal, elite rotation, coup

- By outsiders (crises) <-- small professional army, constitutional/legal international.

Bargained: mass army vs. small professional, constitutional/legal (eventually in Latin America?)

Societal norm → society thinks shouldn't intervene.

Professional ethos → military thinks it shouldn't intervene (both of these are mutually reinforced).

Ryan mass army → societal norm

Small professional → ethos

Hypotheses linking structural with mechanism

Increase GDP → societal norm and allows small professional army position in world system and international norms interact. If you want to join first world, which happens to be comprised of civil governed states (either because it is inherently a better system or because Germany didn't win WWI), you have to change in this direction.

Tyler

NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. Most material on 1990s—9 invited (Germany, Poland, Hungary-Bal, Slovenia, Russia, and Slovakia. And those not invited '94 NATO decides to expand. '97 first expansion (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland). '99 second track expansion starts. '03 completed. Three countries were fast-tracked have less incentive to change now once in. Petersen: can you generate variation across cases?

Tyler: hypothesis: former soviet republics different from others.

Petersen: Baltics are well integrated. Warsaw Pact (e.g.: Poland) different from Romania?